

сультанта Института истории естествознания и техники и Института психологии РАН), которая публикуется на английском языке*. Текст Р.Смита «История человеческой природы: больше об общем или различном?»** выстроена относительно следующего тезиса. Дилемма «Исходить ли в своих взглядах и намерениях из предположения о принципиальном сходстве других людей с нами или из их отличия?» является одновременно познавательной и моральной. Автора интересует, как дает о себе знать эта дилемма в историографии, и в частности, при написании истории представлений (в особенности системного, научного знания) о человеческой природе. Привлекая философский, исторический, психологический материал, он показывает, что существуют «познавательные и моральные обязательства быть открытым к возможности отличия (possibility of difference)». При этом подчеркивается, что не имеет смысла говорить о «превосходстве» одной исследовательской позиции над другой, все зависит от преследуемой цели. Р.Смит полагает, что «разные отношения к инаковости <...> встроены в разные стили письма о прошлом» и прослеживает связь контекстуального подхода в историографии с «открытостью инаковости».

Затем следуют три статьи, выполненные на материале российской истории. Ирина Худушина (старший научный сотрудник Института философии РАН) в статье «Прелюдия к русскому гуманизму» показывает, как масонство, будучи для России XVIII в. *другим* по своему происхождению, привнесенным, пребывало внутри дворянской среды в полемике и с российской традицией, и с иными западными веяниями того времени относительно вопросов морали и веры. «... для русского человека XVIII века (масонская) ложа — мало сказать, ниша или другая культура — это другое измерение, и тем не менее <...> масонство прижилось, приобрело национальные особенности и в результате составило исключительно важную страницу в истории развития самосознания русского общества, в становлении русской духовной культуры».

В статье Ольги Палеховой (научного сотрудника Института философии РАН) «Дифтонг. Культурное местоимение в диалоге с миром (Часть I)» фигурируют две ипостаси *другого*: новое (реформаторское) и иносмысл (подтекст). Автор показывает сплетенность российского «духа преобразований» и «многозначности» в правлении Нико-

* Возможность публикации под одной обложкой текстов на разных языках представляется знаком того, насколько академическая среда открыта для языковой инаковости.

** Данная статья, как и другие тексты сборника, публикуется на языке оригинала впервые.

лая II, а также отклик на это русской культуры рубежа XIX—XX вв. Если на политическом уровне в этот период *другое* было связано преимущественно с событиями драматичными и трагичными, то в культуре оно нашло воплощение, в частности, в гротесковом стиле, подарившем «русской классике новый виток развития».

В тексте Антонины Лазаревой (старшего научного сотрудника Института философии РАН) «К вопросу об этическом монизме русской религиозной философии» роль *другого* играет зло. В то время, как в ряде современных политико-идеологических конструктах (например, «ось зла») категория зла используется для однозначно негативных оценок *другого*, в русской религиозной философии она воспринимается более сложно, как связанная с «*величайшей и самой непонятной* из всех загадок» (С.Л.Франк). «С одной стороны, требуется его (зла. — А.С.) безусловное искоренение, с другой — оно есть также путь, ведущий к добру...» (Н.Н.Бубнов); «зло не лишено смысла», «зло имеет служебную положительную ценность» (Н.О.Лосский). Представление о том, что «моральное зло исходит от человека и обнаруживается через его поступки», существенно сокращает дистанцию между личностью и злом-*другим*, при этом возлагая ответственность на первую.

Завершает раздел «Опыт презентации» фрагмент дипломной работы выпускника кафедры истории и теории мировой культуры МГУ Арсения Хитрова «Идея метода: философия Декарта и доктрина литературного классицизма», демонстрирующая историческую относительность самой проблематики *другого*. Автор текстуально доказывает, что идея метода выступала «единой ментальной программой» для философии Декарта и французского литературного классицизма. Следуя за представленным анализом, читатель ощущает, насколько неуютно, тесно было проблематике *другого* среди принципов порядка, ясности, простоты, тождества личности, главенства Разума — базовых для философских и литературных у становок французской культуры XVII в. Данная статья как бы возвращает нас к тезису Р.Смита о значимости «контекстуальной методологии», в том числе применительно к феномену *другого*.

В раздел «Опыт наблюдения» вошли тексты, затрагивающие конкретные «практики». Нина Сосна (аспирантка философского факультета Государственного университета гуманитарных наук) в статье «Невидимое лицо Другого: феноменологические исследования Ж.-Л. Мариона» пытается осмыслить позицию, «порядок видения», когда не «Я», а Другой выступает «точкой отсчета». Вслед за французским теологом Марионом она обращается к феноменам, кото-

рые «наше видение превосходят», «провоцируют» его, «не видятся», а «нам являются, даются, дарят себя, и мы можем сделаться лишь **свидетелями** их появления».

В тексте Аси Сыродеевой (старшего научного сотрудника Института философии РАН) «Близкий Другой» речь идет о мире детства, которому мы, взрослые, когда-то естественным образом принадлежали. Со временем этот мир превращается в мир Другого — ребенка. Удивительным образом ребенок-Другой помогает нам многое ощутить и понять. В частности, что инаковость является одной из принципиальных характеристик жизни личности, ибо неумолимый бег времени неустанно меняет, превращает в **другое** мир вокруг и нас самих.

Текст Валерия Перевалова (старшего научного сотрудника Института философии РАН) «"Л" — 13 буква» выполнен в своеобразной технике письма. Автор статьи простираивает мостки между современным языком и языком иных исторических эпох. С помощью подобного рода работы в пространстве языка В.Перевалов стремится воссоздать тот или иной вектор культуры, соединяющий нас и наших исторических Других.

Авторы издания отдают себе отчет в том, что они двигаются во многом «по краям» проблематики, связанной с феноменом **другого**. Этот путь не сулит обретение картины(-коллажа), отличающейся полнотой, но позволяет ощутить, сколь широк культуроведческий потенциал данной проблематики и сколь открыта она для разных взглядов и подходов.

Предлагая сюжет об «относительности инаковости» на роль сквозного в данном издании, хотелось наметить одно из возможных направлений преодоления крайних позиций: акцентирование инаковости и ее стирание (отрицание) — каждая из которых на сегодняшний день вызывает немало нареканий в свой адрес. Признание относительности инаковости предполагает вопрошание, сомнение социального субъекта по поводу сложившегося стиля отношения к **другому** и принятие на себя ответственности за собственную позицию. В частности, есть надежда, что при таком подходе проблемы Другого будут игнорироваться в меньшей степени и то, что в качестве требования (или упрека) предъявляется Другим, будет переадресовано нам самим. А еще, что в какой-то мере на эту позицию ответят взаимностью.

Ася Сыродеева

ОПЫТ ПРЕЗЕНТАЦИИ

Roger Smith

The History of Human Nature: More of the Same or Facing the Other?

There is a significant cognitive and moral dilemma. Should we know and act on the assumption that other people are basically similar to ourselves, or assume that other people are, in a deep sense, different? It is a very common humanistic sentiment to feel that all people are «in essence» similar, or have a single human nature, and on this basis humanists justify the ideal of equal rights and dignity for all people. If there were no shared human nature, on what grounds would we treat people as members of the same category and hence equally objects of our moral concern? Thus Isaiah Berlin stated: «The fact that men are men and women are women and not dogs or cats or tables or chairs is an objective fact; and part of this objective fact is that there are certain values, and only those values, which men, while remaining men, can pursue»¹. Yet there are powerful voices, such as Nietzsche's or Foucault's, which declare the belief in an essential human nature wrong as an epistemological principle, misguided as to fact and opposed to human freedom. According to this point of view, the claim that there is a universal, trans-historical subject, man, is unfounded, and pious assertions about man impose one discourse as if it were uniquely valid when it is not. The trouble the English language has when it uses a gendered term, «man», also as a collective term for all people illustrates the point. There are different views about how far the term denotes a universal or a particular. In short, we face the dilemma whether we do cognitive and moral justice to people by starting from the proposition that they are like ourselves or from the proposition that they are other.

At one pole of opinion are people, perhaps evolutionary biologists or those with a religious faith about the soul, who believe that they possess uniquely valid knowledge of human nature. At the opposite pole, there are

postmodern theorists and artists who celebrate possibilities, as they see them, for the continuous recreation of human identities and, through modern technologies, for re-shaping the body, the genes and even forms of life. The former like to emphasise the underlying permanence of human nature, the latter prefer to get rid of the word and emphasise the flexibility of human identities. These differences of opinion actually raise some very complex questions. In order to think more precisely about the dilemma, I therefore propose in this paper to examine it as a problem which historians face when they write history. (That is, I will discuss the presence of the dilemma in historiography.) In particular, I am interested in how to write the history of belief about human nature itself, especially where this belief takes the form of systematic, scientific knowledge. What are the strengths and weaknesses of presupposing the essential unity, or of presupposing the possibility of otherness, in writing history of beliefs about the nature of being human? To anticipate my conclusion, I shall argue that there are cognitive and moral reasons to assume that earlier people and earlier beliefs about what a human being is, may, in a significant sense, be other.

I first discuss some general (or philosophical) questions about the conditions of knowledge of what it is to be human and about knowledge of unity and diversity. There is then an illustrative review of some of the positions which historians of knowledge of human nature, and particularly historians of psychology, have taken. (This discusses aspects of what a number of contemporary English-language writers call the history of the human sciences; but the term «human sciences» translates awkwardly into Russian².) The paper concludes with an argument for the cognitive and moral virtues, in historical writing, of an imagination about what is other.

The basic model of historical work is a historian attempting to interpret and subsequently to explain a text or other artefact (the so-called primary source) from another time. The historian, like any other investigator, is an interpreter, asking what an object is and what it means. Interpretation, it has long been understood, involves a double movement, like a dialogue, between the interpreter's knowledge and way of thought and the knowledge and way of thought that the historical object expresses. For interpretation to be possible, or for dialogue to occur, it is logically necessary that the interpreting subject and the interpreted object have something in common. As Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote: «All understanding presupposes in the person who understands, as a condition of its possibility, an analogue of that which will be understood later: an original, antecedent congruity between subject and object»³. Without this element in common nothing could be said that would constitute an interpretation; writing would instead always

be fiction. Just so, people in the artistic or philosophical avant-garde have sometimes said: we are isolated from what is other and can only invent stories about it. All the same, daily life, the academic discipline of history and certainly ordinary language use presupposes that interpretation is a meaningful and rational activity and is not the same as fiction; and it is this that is relevant here.

It is also a necessary part of the act of interpretation, however, that the interpreter always — logically, must — bring something to the description of an object which is then claimed to be in the object. The object itself cannot supply the terms for its own description. The act of description is an interpretive act, and there is therefore no uniquely valid description for any object. There is a kind of circularity in interpretation — as philosophers of hermeneutics have long appreciated. Heidegger noted that «in every case interpretation is grounded in something we see in advance — in a fore-sight», and, as he wrote in a typically gnomic utterance, «whenever we encounter anything in the world, the world has already been previously discovered»⁴. The logical positivists systematically tried to develop an alternative theory of knowledge, which would escape circularity by making formally confirmed observation statements. But this project failed. There is no possibility of a neutral position in description; all description is interpretation — we cannot make statements about an object independent of the conceptual or theoretical framework in terms of which we make those statements. As a result, «the world was disclosed to man only in terms of the questions he asked of it and the purposes with which he addressed it»⁵.

What we can know about people in general, or one person in particular, or about ourselves, depends on the purposes, embedded in historically formed languages and practices, which we actually have. This is so even if the purpose were, following Kant, to ask the most general possible question, «*Was ist der Mensch?*»⁶. Any answer is an interpretation, and any interpretation *presupposes* something in common, something shared, between subject and object. Yet, as this is a matter of logic and not a conclusion of empirical science or natural history, it tells us nothing about *what* people share in common. Indeed, a number of humanistic philosophers, including Berlin, have recognised that the term «human» primarily has logical, metaphysical or moral meaning, and only secondarily empirical content. Somewhat in the spirit of Kant, who defined a rational human being as possessing a capacity to act freely according to the moral imperative, Berlin used the word «human» to define, not describe, a category of being possessing certain qualities. «Our conscious idea of man — of how men differ from other entities, of what is human and what is not human or inhuman — involves the use of some among the basic categories in terms of which we

perceive and order and interpret data. To analyse the concept of man is to recognize these categories for what they are. To do this is to realize that they are categories, that is, that they are not themselves subjects for scientific hypotheses about the data which they order»⁷. Clearly, *to define* being human in this way builds a presumption about the shared qualities of human beings into any interpretation of what a human does.

Reference to «the other» in philosophical writing appears first in the literature, which Kant launched, reconsidering from the ground up the conditions for knowledge. Both Kant and the Idealists who followed him (and who rejected the limits which he had placed on knowledge of what is real) *defined* a common humanity in terms of the intrinsic properties of reason and freedom. Attempting to articulate the metaphysical ground, the basis in being, of this common humanity, Fichte and then Hegel posited an original, creative state which, in order to have knowledge of itself, has to create division or difference. Their writing thus put forward a notion of «the other» as a logical requirement for the possibility of self-conscious reflective knowledge of the original «I» (Fichte) or Absolute Spirit or *Geist* (Hegel). Thus, for Fichte and Hegel, «the other» is logically implicit in the reflexive act, the act where the world, taking the form of expressive human activity, creates knowledge of itself. Hegel wrote: «A self-consciousness exists *for a self-consciousness*. Only so is it in fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become explicit for it». Hegel then recreated this logical argument as the driving force of history, and this made the historical ages of the human world into stages into the self-realisation of *Geist*, generating difference out of an original unity. Human subjects, he argued, require the presence of what is not themselves in order to come to knowledge of themselves. «Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged»⁸. The need of consciousness for an other in order to be self-consciousness became, in his history, the motor of domination, the creator of master and slave and the subsequent development of the social and political world. Only at the end of history, with the full self-consciousness of the Absolute of itself as unfolding in history, he argued, would the other appear in its true form as the expression of the ideal unity.

The notion of «the other», strictly speaking, thus had logical content before it had existential or moral, let alone empirical content. But the history of the notion since Hegel has confounded boundaries between what is logical and what is empirical. There are logical grounds for holding that «the human» (as Berlin wrote) is a category in terms of which we shape empirical knowledge, and is not itself an empirical category. And there are logical grounds to hold that interpretation requires some identity of subject and

object. At the same time, there are the empirical facts (Berlin, for example, referred to moral facts) which appear to give content to the category of «the human». In a sort of mirror image with the notion of human nature, there is a similar situation with the notion of «the other»: difference is a logical requirement of knowledge, but at the same time there are the empirical facts which give content to difference. What the proper relation is between logical and empirical statements is a complex matter for philosophers (and they hold divergent views); but it clearly creates difficulties in contemporary discussion of human identity and difference and for the moral questions thus posed. Two alternative possibilities, the first sharply separating philosophical and scientific claims (as was the norm in academic culture influenced by analytic philosophy) and the second, naturalism (common in much contemporary philosophy of mind), which supports empirical research into identity and difference, each have their problems. A third alternative, Hegel's, which explained the empirical and historical content of the world as the unfolding of logical reason, will hardly now attract followers.

The route that this paper takes to this cluster of issues is to examine what writers in one field, the intellectual history of thought about human nature, actually say. But though I discuss only one field, it is worth bearing in mind that the same underlying questions and difficulties about the logic and empirical content of identity and difference face psychology, sociology, philology, anthropology and related disciplines, as well as history. When a philologist translates a word in one language by a word in another, what is the guarantee beyond the interpretative act itself that there is indeed a common meaning? As translators well know, there are many occasions when any translation that might be suggested will be controversial. The common practice of leaving certain words in the original language — English-language writers commonly leave words like «*Geist*», «*esprit*» and «*perestroika*» untranslated, for example — illustrates this awareness. In cultural anthropology there is argument about whether what in one culture appear to be basic categories for dividing up the world, like «individual» or «economy», are indeed categories in terms of which all other peoples divide up the world. The attempt to define «religion» is a well-known problem case in point, since many scholars would admit into the class of practices called religion activities that do not involve belief in a god, though for many believers a religion without a god is a contradiction in terms. Among historians there are debates about the continuity or discontinuity across time of basic forms of social and political organisation, such as the family and the state. There is a very real question, for example, whether the pre-Christian world had a historical consciousness like the Christian world, since the latter believed in an imminent ending and the former not.

Among historians of science there is argument about the comparability of ancient Greek and modern «science» and about whether the Greeks studied such things as «psychology» and «the mind».

The empirical sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries took a different route from the one Hegel had projected for them. Scientists classified their objects of study in terms of what they considered to be natural categories, categories that resulted from experience and observation. Historians understood terms like «human nature», «race», «science», «nation» and «progress» to denote naturally existing features of the human world, features given by the *fact* of human presence. Scholars assumed that their basic categories provided a valid framework for describing all times and all places. As a result, historians got on with understanding the particular content and expression of these categories in the lives of different people. They studied, for example, how earlier people differentiated human and not human, assigned specific characters to different nations or races, succeeded or not in constructing scientific knowledge and made progress or degenerated. Thus the dominant practice of western historians — like philologists and anthropologists, though I will not discuss them — was to address the dilemma, with which this essay began, by *presuming* the identity of basic categories. The general empirical ethos of science, natural science and humanistic science alike, supported and confirmed this choice.

All the same, the dilemma did not go away: on what grounds can a scientist decide that an object about which she seeks knowledge is like or unlike a known object? How do historians respond to the possibility that the object of their knowledge is really other? I will now discuss how writing in the intellectual history of science has responded to this dilemma. This will lead to the argument that the basic categories in terms of which we describe human nature themselves have a history, and hence that there are very different ways of being human — as Giambattista Vico, in the early eighteenth century, was perhaps the first to explore in a systematic way.

The philosophical dilemma confronting the historian was well understood by the English philosopher and historian of Roman Britain, R.G. Collingwood. As he pointed out, for all the fiercely enforced practice among academic historians of consulting the evidence, historians never come face to face with the past. «The historical past is the world of ideas which the present evidence creates in the present. In historical inference we do not move from our present world to a past world; the movement in experience is always a movement within a present world of ideas»⁹. «The past» is a creation of what historians (and everyone else who tells stories) write about the variety of memorials, documents, traditions and memories in the present. As a result, we cannot judge whether the lives and nature of earlier people were like our

own from comparing past and present in a naively empirical manner. The judgement must come from comparing different ways of writing in the present. And there are indeed different ways of writing history, depending on whether an author interprets the meaning of sources primarily by reference to modern sources or interprets them by reference primarily to sources contemporary with or historically relevant to the source under study. Only the latter is historical work properly so-called, but the former is very common. The latter takes a *contextual* approach to meaning. What I want to argue is that *contextual, historical writing leads to the awareness of the possible otherness of an object of study*. By contrast, the former type of writing, which interprets the meaning of a source from comparison with writing or knowledge which is not part of the source's context, excludes the possibility of acknowledging otherness. Different relations to otherness are therefore built into different styles of writing about the past. Openness to otherness, I suggest, comes from recreating different contexts. This recreating involves both interpretative discipline and imagination.

An emphasis on knowledge of *context* in historical work relevant to the history of science became prominent in the English-speaking world in the 1960s and 1970s. It began with a debate about the proper manner of understanding the meaning of classic texts in political theory, such as Machiavelli's «Il principe» (written 1513) or Hobbes' «Leviathan» (published 1651). Most scholars initially insisted that the value of these texts, and the value of returning to them now, lies with their contribution to political theory, understood as a continuous and continuing effort to lay bare the powers and obligations of the state and of individuals and thus to make clear the nature and goals of political life. Several scholars, notably John Dunn and Quentin Skinner, then argued, with the rigorous precision of the ordinary language philosophy of J. L. Austin, that it is not possible to say what a text *means* by interpreting it in relation to supposed eternal questions or trans-historical ideas, such as justice. Rather, they argued, it follows from the way we use language that we must interpret a text in relation to the context in which the text was written, *if* we are to say we know what the text *means*. In ordinary language, the meaning of a statement comes from the use the statement has, not from abstract definitions. «We should study not the meanings of the words, but their use. For the given idea cannot ultimately be said ... to *have* any meaning that can take the form of a set of words which can then be excogitated [thought out and developed in thought] and traced out over time. Rather the meaning of the idea must *be* its uses to refer in various ways»¹⁰. In writing, an author like Hobbes (Skinner's prime case study) used language which had meaning by virtue of that language's place in a debate or actions of which his text was part and to which it contributed. The later reader cannot